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WELFARE STATE OR WELFARE COURT:
ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE
Sheila Jasanoff & Dogan Perese*
INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court issued its landmark
evidence ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,1
much ink has been spilled on how best to incorporate scientific and
technical evidence into legal decisions. Interestingly, all concerned
agree that the causes of the problem lie somewhere outside the
courtroom door, although attorneys, scholars, and litigants by no
means agree on just where in relation to that door—in particular,
whether inside or outside it—to locate their proposed remedies.
Corporate defendants have largely accepted the view that the
problem has to do with importing “junk science”2 into the
* Sheila Jasanoff is Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology
Studies at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. Dogan
Perese is a second-year student at Harvard Law School.
1
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2
See Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk
Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1638-39 (1993) (summarizing one
author’s definition of “junk science” as “the mirror image of real science . . .
cut[ting] across chemistry and pharmacology, medicine and engineering . . . . It
is a catalog of every conceivable error: data dredging, wishful thinking,
truculent dogmatism, and now and again, outright fraud”). See also Kara-Anne
Yaren, Trade and Genetically Modified Foods: Frankenfears: A Call for
Consistency, 1 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 149 (2001) (noting that
although “there is no precise definition of ‘junk science’ there is a useful
definition of a scientifically valid methodology: whether the theory in question
can be (and) . . . has been subjected to peer review and publication, its known or
potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling
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courtroom. Accordingly, industry’s preferred solution is to insist,
as Daubert did, on proactive judicial gate-keeping at the pretrial
stage.3 Judges, on this view, have a duty to ensure that only good
science makes its way past a Daubert hearing to technically
untutored and possibly too credulous juries. Just as passionately,
much of the plaintiffs’ bar believes that the causes of the problem
lie considerably further back in time than the pretrial phase, as well
as spatially further away from the legal process, in varieties of
corporate misconduct that only jury trials can adequately sanction,
for instance, in sometimes willful disregard for citizens,
consumers, and workers; in the refusal to carry out timely research
on health, safety and environmental problems; and in the
sponsorship of biased and misleading research. Where defendants
wave the red flag of “junk science,” plaintiffs point to the
notorious example of “tobacco science,” studies commissioned by
the tobacco industry in an effort to demonstrate that cigarette
smoke, one of the most securely established of all cancer-causing
agents, poses no health risks to humans.
In this paper, we too trace the reasons for science’s
unsatisfactory engagement with the law to places outside the
courtroom, only our analysis treats the law-science relationship in
the United States as an epiphenomenon of a dynamic that reaches
deeply into political culture. Further, we suggest that the problem
of law and science in modern industrial democracies cannot be
divorced from the deeper problem of responding justly and
efficiently to the residual risks created by technological activity.
The latter issue, moreover, is handled very differently in different
national legal and policy systems. Our focus here is on America’s
unique reliance on litigation to frame and find remedies for health
problems allegedly caused by human negligence or error in private
its operation, and whether it has attracted wide spread acceptance within a
relevant community”).
3
See, e.g., Gen. Elec Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (establishing a
discretionary standard of review for reviewing trial court’s determination of
expert qualifications where industry sought review of trial court’s decision to
allow unreliable expert testimony); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137 (1999) (extending the Daubert requirements to include all expert
testimony).
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enterprise. Using evidence from other countries, we argue that
providing legislative solutions to such problems would reduce the
litigation burden on United States courts. In the process, courts
would also be relieved of a high percentage of the difficult expert
conflicts that currently occupy their time and drain their resources.
The example we use to illustrate these points is United States
asbestos litigation over approximately the past quarter-century.
Comparing the American record on this issue with that of several
European countries, we suggest that asbestos lawsuits have forced
the United States court system to perform the redistributive
functions of a welfare state, only at higher cost and with greater
inefficiency than if the state had chosen simply to compensate
asbestos victims directly.4 Our argument goes beyond the frequent
critique of litigation as an economically inefficient means of
redistribution and calls attention to its deficiencies as a device for
rendering justice under conditions of inadequate knowledge and
endemic uncertainty.
Put differently, we suggest that courts are inefficient
distributors of welfare benefits not only because the legal process
is too expensive in general terms, but more specifically because
adjudication uses the act of making causal determinations as a
conduit, or an obligatory point of passage, to redistribution. This is
a particularly wasteful strategy in cases like asbestos, where the
cost of individualized fact-finding has prompted large aggregated
proceedings, with the somewhat perverse result of compensating
more uncertain causal claims at relatively higher rates than more
certain ones. In both this and similar cases, experience from other
countries suggests that more equitable and socially acceptable
outcomes could be arrived at without channeling the compensatory
process through the bottleneck of case-by-case fact-finding—or
seeking creative ways around that bottleneck. Public law
frameworks would have the merit of focusing more directly on the
injuries to be compensated than on the often uncertain causal chain
that connects claimed injuries to the private behaviors that
allegedly caused them.
4

See generally Laurie Kazan-Allen, Asbestos Compensation in Europe,
INTERNATIONAL BAN ASBESTOS SECRETARIAT, May 30, 2000.

JASANOFFPERESEMACRO.DOC

622

4/23/2004 12:55 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

We do not address whether the different compensation systems
considered in this paper arrive at optimal valuations of the cost of
disease or injury for particular conditions and claimants. In other
words, we do not ask whether mesothelioma or asbestosis are
compensated at too high or too low a rate in the United States or
elsewhere. The more general point we make is that judgments like
these should be, at bottom, a matter of political deliberation in
democratic nations. And to make such assessments, the relative
openness and transparency of the legislative process is
institutionally better suited than substitutes crafted by a no matter
how ingenious judiciary.
I.

ONE PROBLEM, MANY MANIFESTATIONS

Asbestos is the generic name for a variety of naturally
occurring mineral fibers once widely used as fire retardants in
construction and consumer products, including building insulation,
ship-building, asbestos cement piping, brake linings, fireproof
textiles, and even home hair dryers.5 Already in the 1920s,
employers began to notice higher incidences of lung disease and
cancer among asbestos workers. By the 1970s, surmise turned into
science as those initial observations hardened into published
epidemiological findings.6 Asbestos exposure was responsible for
causing degenerative and eventually fatal lung disease, as well as
several kinds of cancer, including one, mesothelioma, that was
exclusively associated with asbestos and similar fibrous materials.7
Population-based studies made it possible to conjecture how many
additional cases, and of which kinds, might be expected over time.
5

U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Asbestos: General Information, at
http://www.epa.gov/asbestos/help.html (Mar. 9, 2004). There are six major types
of asbestos fiber, of which the most frequently used are chrysotile, a member of
the serpentine mineral family, amosite, and crocidolite, both belonging to the
amphibole group. Id.
6
See generally IRVING J. SELIKOFF, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE (Academic
Press 1978). See also, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health
Administration: Safety and Health Topics: Asbestos, at http://www.osha.gov/
SLTC/asbestos/index.html (last revised Aug. 28, 2003).
7
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 5.
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Yet these predictions repeatedly underestimated the actual
incidence of disease, as new classes of exposed persons were
identified and asbestos-induced illness appeared even in people
exposed to the substance outside of occupational contexts.
In general, the United States court system does relatively well
at settling claims when the nature and causes of injury are well
understood and the damages are clear, as for instance in routine
automobile accidents. In the case of asbestos, abundant evidence
documented the connections between exposure and disease;
mesothelioma in particular was a signature disease, associated only
with asbestos. Why then did asbestos litigation prove to be such an
intractable problem for American courts? A major corporate
mishap of recent years offers a number of clues. In 1998, the huge
oil and gas services company Halliburton acquired Dresser
Industries, its main rival, thereby immediately becoming the
largest concern in the business.8 Eager Halliburton dealmakers,
however, did not inquire into Dresser’s legal liability from longdormant asbestos lawsuits. It proved to be an epic miscalculation
for Halliburton. According to a New Yorker article, “The asbestos
settlements devastated the company’s stock price, which fell by
eighty percent in just over a year.”9 One can speculate in retrospect
that there was a failure of due diligence in investigating
outstanding legal claims against Dresser, but more important from
our standpoint is how such massive liabilities could have been
overlooked in the first place. What is it about asbestos–related
injuries that can render them both so numerous and so invisible?
Like the diseases that asbestos induces, compensation claims
can lie hidden for many years. Long latency periods make it
difficult to state with certainty when conditions will appear or how
severely they will progress in given individuals. Uncertainty
surrounds not only the timing, number, and seriousness of claims,
but also the connection of particular claims to particular
circumstances of exposure. Different asbestos fiber types are
associated with different levels of risk, and more than one type
8

See Jane Mayer, Contract Sport, Vol. 80, Issue 1 NEW YORKER, February
16 & 23, 2004, at 87.
9
Id.
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may be mixed into a particular product. Worker and consumer
mobility impede attempts to pinpoint with accuracy how given
claimants were exposed or how likely they are to fall ill. In short,
even though the health impacts of asbestos are relatively well
known in scientific terms, classes of plaintiffs and defendants
remain indeterminate for purposes of the law, often for long
periods of time. Under these conditions it has proved almost
impossible to stem the tide of asbestos lawsuits or to adjudicate
them efficiently once they have been initiated.
To appreciate the consequences of these uncertainties for the
American legal process, it is instructive to compare the burden of
asbestos actions on United States courts and on courts in other
industrial nations where asbestos has exacted similar tolls in
disease and death. Comparative information on asbestos claims
and recoveries, however, has to be interpreted against a backdrop
of radical differences in state responsibility for public health
protection and associated cultures of regulation, risk management,
and expertise. Differences between United States and European
litigation patterns only make sense if we take into account how
lawsuits operate in relation to other social mechanisms for taking
care of the victims of illness and disability.
II. CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH AND LITIGATION
Suits to recover damages for disease and injury in the United
States play out within a health care system that is uniquely laissez
faire by comparison with those of other industrial democracies.
United States citizens, unlike most of their European counterparts,
are not generally covered by national health insurance.10 Medicare
and Medicaid, enacted in 1965 as part of the Great Society
legislative program, provide basic coverage for older and low
income citizens, respectively.11 The remaining majority of
10

Nat’l Coalition on Health Care, Health Insurance Coverage, at
http://www.nchc.org/facts/coverage.shtml (2003).
11
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Information Resources.
at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicare/ (last modified Sept. 12, 2003). Current
Medicare/Medicaid statistics show that there are 40.5 million enrollees in
Medicare and 40.1 million enrollees in Medicaid. Id.
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Americans are covered, if at all, by varying employer-funded or
private insurance schemes, leaving a large fraction of the
population wholly uninsured.12 A generously supported national
research and development system, coordinated by the National
Institutes of Health, has achieved extraordinary success in finding
cures for individuals willing and able to pay for these results;
striking examples include the advances made in drug treatment for
AIDS13 and cancer over the past two decades. But while the more
privileged have access to arguably the world’s most sophisticated
health care system, millions enjoy no such benefits, and health
statistics for the poorest fifth of the United States population more
closely resemble those of developing countries than of highly
industrialized ones.
European countries, by contrast, provide substantially more
equitable nationwide coverage under variously funded insurance
programs. Universal, state-sponsored insurance is the rule, with
emphasis on equity across individuals, possibly at the expense of
innovation in the domain of rare illnesses and designer drugs.
Preventive public health strategies are favored in relation to
potentially expensive therapies, leading in turn to greater emphasis
on clinical care in relation to biomedical research and
development. These differences are summarized in Table 1, albeit
in highly simplified and schematic terms that do not do justice to
the complexities of either the United States or the varied European
health care systems.

12

Nat’l Coalition on Health Care, supra note 10.
See STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE
POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (University of California Press 1996) (accounting of
how people with AIDS influenced the research process).
13
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TABLE 1—HEALTH POLICY, CITIZENS, AND THE STATE
UNITED STATES

EUROPE

Private insurance

Social insurance, orchestrated by the
state
Universal coverage, variously funded
Worker compensation

Coverage through employment
Worker compensation for non-white
collar employees
High-quality care for considerable
fraction of population; sub-standard
care for others
Focus on science-driven cures

Relative equality of care across
individuals and regions
Focus on primary care and
prevention

A second sphere of difference that affects both the volume and
outcome of asbestos litigation is the role of experts within the
judicial system. A sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between
the common law and civil law traditions. In the former, scientific
and technical evidence is usually supplied by party experts and
competing claims are adjudicated through the adversary process; in
the latter, experts are court-appointed and have a duty to provide
impartial expertise to the presiding judges. In civil law systems, the
judge, not the parties, decides what types of expertise are germane
to the matter at hand, and experts are often chosen on the basis of
their affiliation with particular institutions or professional groups.
Judicial management of expert evidence centralizes adjudicatory
fact-finding and lowers the costs of the process; costs are further
contained in many jurisdictions through fixed fee schedules for
expert witnesses. Table 2 summarizes these differences, again in
highly simplified form.
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TABLE 2—ROLE AND NATURE OF EXPERTISE IN THE COURTS
UNITED STATES
(COMMON LAW)
Party appointed
Strategically chosen
Stress on technical qualifications
Adversarially examined
Open to discovery

EUROPE
(CIVIL LAW)
Court appointed
“Neutral”
Institutional roles matter
Advisor to court
Opinion giver, not subject to
discovery

It is worth noting too that the cost of fact-finding differs even
within common law jurisdictions. Britain patterns with other
European nations, and not with the United States, in barring
contingency fees and adopting the rule that the loser of a lawsuit
ordinarily pays the winner’s costs. Such measures create high
threshold barriers for plaintiffs and may inhibit potentially
legitimate as well as frivolous claims, but they reduce the overall
amount and cost of litigation.
III. ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF
HISTORY
Researchers have estimated that over 100 million people in the
United States were occupationally exposed to asbestos during the
twentieth century.14 This includes the 27.5 million Americans
estimated to be exposed to asbestos between 1940 and 1980.15 At
least 600,000 individuals have filed claims for harm resulting from
asbestos exposure and, because individuals typically file such
claims against multiple defendants, the total number of claims is
actually much larger.16 In the year 2000 alone, 12 large
14

AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, OVERVIEW OF ASBESTOS ISSUES AND
TRENDS, PUBLIC POLICY MONOGRAPH (Dec. 2001), available at
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/mono_dec01asbestos.pdf.
15
Id.
16
Michelle J. White, Explaining the Flood of Asbestos Litigation:
Consolidation, Bifurcation, and Bouquet Trials, NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
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corporations reported that 520,000 new asbestos claims were filed
against them.17 Insurers of asbestos defendants have paid an
estimated $32 billion in compensation to claimants; the result of
such costly liability has led about 80 firms to file for bankruptcy,
30 of which filed since early 2000.18
Defendants’ bankruptcies, however, have not dissuaded further
asbestos mass tort claims as might have been expected. Instead,
plaintiffs’ lawyers are filing even more claims on behalf of
claimants whose injuries are less severe and against defendants
whose involvement with asbestos production is increasingly
tangential. With an effectively limitless supply of both plaintiffs
and defendants, asbestos has earned the distinction of being the
largest mass tort in United States legal history.19 Two recent
predictions of its total cost came out at $200 and $275 billion,
suggesting that asbestos may end up costing more than Superfund,
the most costly environmental program run by the United States
federal government.20
Asbestos litigation has evolved from a once regional issue into
a national one and as courts modify their handling of increasingly
numerous cases, claimants predictably seek fora in which they can
achieve speedy resolution with a maximum payout and a minimum
of litigation time and cost. In the early days of United States
asbestos litigation (1970–1987), 60 percent of state court asbestos
personal injury cases were filed in four states: California,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Illinois.21 By 1998–2000, however,
filings of asbestos cases in these states accounted for only 7
percent of the total.22 At the other extreme, five states—
Mississippi, New York, West Virginia, Ohio, and Texas—that had
accounted for 9 percent of the cases filed before 1988 accounted

9362 (Dec. 2002), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9362.pdf.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS
COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT (Rand 2002).
22
Id.

AND
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for 66 percent of filings between 1998 and 2000.23 In part, the
cases track legal changes easing plaintiffs’ access to the courts. In
California, for example, section 340.2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure gives priority for trial scheduling to all plaintiffs with a
terminal illness, allowing plaintiffs with mesothelioma to get to
trial quickly.24 Similarly, New York City has a special expedited
trial schedule for asbestos plaintiffs with mesothelioma and other
cancers.25 Under Mississippi rules, trial courts lack the authority to
order independent medical examinations of plaintiffs, limiting
defendants’ ability to challenge asbestos plaintiffs’ disease
allegations.26 In Texas, where asbestos cases are dispersed over
multiple jurisdictions and there are many different law firms
representing plaintiffs, defendants who are named on thousands of
cases may be noticed on the same day for scores of trials in a
dozen or more jurisdictions.27 All these factors place special
settlement pressures on defendants, leading to a greater number of
settlements than might otherwise be anticipated.
Over the last decade, the annual number of claims filed against
most United States defendants has increased substantially, with
some defendants seeing claims double in a single year. The
number of defendants named by the typical claimant is also
increasing. In the early 1980s, claimants typically named about 20
different defendants; by the mid-1990s, that number may have
risen to 60 to 70 defendants.28

23

Id.
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 340.2 (Deering 2004).
25
CARROLL ET AL., supra note 21.
26
Swan v. I.P., Inc., 613 So. 2d 846 (Miss. 1993).
27
CARROLL ET AL., supra note 21.
28
DEBORAH R. HANSLER ET. AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING
PUBLIC GOODS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 56 (1999), at http://www.rand.org/
publications/MR/MR969/.
24
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TABLE 3—U.S. ASBESTOS LITIGATION, 1982 AND 2002

Number of claimants
Number of defendants
Average number of defendants per
claimant
Total costs to date
(nominal)
Bankruptcies
Estimated total future costs
(nominal)

1982

2002

21,000
300
20

600,000
6,000
60-70

$1 billion

$54 billion

3
$38 billion

80
$145-275 billion

About two-thirds of United States plaintiffs whose claims
reached final verdict through trial from 1993 to 2001 won an
award, somewhat higher than the rate of plaintiff success
nationally in all tort suits, and substantially higher than the rate of
plaintiff success in product liability suits in many metropolitan
jurisdictions.29 Mesothelioma plaintiffs were most likely to be
successful, but more than half of the claims for conditions other
than cancer and asbestosis also succeeded.30
The mean verdict for successful plaintiff claims over the period
was about $1.8 million, but mean awards varied substantially by
disease category, from $322 thousand for nonmalignant diseases
other than asbestosis to $3.8 million for mesothelioma. The mean
award for successful asbestosis claims topped $1.6 million. The
mean award for successful mesothelioma claims rose dramatically
from about $2 million in 1998 to upwards of $6 million in 2001,
while the mean award for successful asbestosis claims increased
five-fold, from $1 million in 1999 to $5 million in 2001. Just over
half of the plaintiffs whose claims reached verdict were awarded
several hundred thousand dollars or more. About one-quarter of the
successful plaintiffs were awarded in excess of a million dollars.
As in most tort litigation, a smallish number of very large awards
29
30

Id.
Id.

JASANOFFPERESEMACRO.DOC

4/23/2004 12:55 PM

INADEQUACIES OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION

631

account for the majority of all the money awarded.31
The Claims Resolution Management Corporation, an
organization which monitors the disbursement of asbestos claims
and advises prospective litigants, recently published the
distribution of the Manville Trust’s claims payments by disease
category from 1995 through 2001.32 According to these data,
mesothelioma claims accounted for about four percent of the total
claims paid by the Trust over that period.33 About 20 percent of the
dollars paid by the Trust over the same period went to
mesothelioma claimants, whereas about 8 percent were for cancers
other than mesothelioma; that group received about 16 percent of
the dollars.34 Interestingly, nonmalignant claims accounted for
about 88 percent of claims and 64 percent of dollars paid out.35
IV. JUDICIAL INNOVATION AND ITS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Asbestos claims are concentrated in a few courts and the
volume of claims in these courts makes it infeasible to hold
individual trials for all claimants. To help stem judicial gridlock,
judges have responded by developing innovative procedures
intended to resolve large numbers of cases at minimal cost in court
time.36 One notable procedural innovation is consolidated trials,
which are trials of multiple asbestos claims held simultaneously
before a single jury. The jury makes separate decisions for each
plaintiff against each defendant. Another such innovation is
bifurcation, which divides the trial into two or more phases. In
bifurcated trials, the jury decides liability in the first phase and
damages in the second, while in reverse bifurcated trials the order
is switched. After phase one, the judge suspends trial and directs
the parties to negotiate a settlement, sometimes becoming closely
31

CARROLL ET AL., supra note 21.
David Austern, “THE MANVILLE TRUST EXPERIENCE,” MEALY’S
ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE (Claims Resolution Management
Corporation, Fairfax, VA, 2001).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
White, supra note 16.
32
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involved in the negotiations. For instance, the judge may threaten
that, if the parties cannot reach a settlement, she will direct the jury
to consider punitive damages. A third innovation is the “bouquet”
trial in which a small group of cases is selected for trial from a
larger group that may include thousands of cases. At the end of the
bouquet trial, the judge directs the parties to settle the larger group
of cases based on the result of the small group outcomes. If
negotiations do not result in settlement, the judge may threaten to
use the same jury to decide additional cases in the large group.37
White provides a few notable examples of such innovations in
action. In 1998, a reverse bifurcated bouquet trial of 12 plaintiffs’
asbestos claims in Mississippi resulted in phase one compensatory
damages totaling $48 million.38 When the judge threatened to put
the issue of punitive damages before the same jury, the defendants
settled the 12 cases, reportedly for the full amount of the damage
awards.39 The judge then scheduled 63 more cases for trial before
the same jury. The defendants submitted an emergency appeal to
the Mississippi Supreme Court seeking to disqualify the judge for
bias, but their appeal was denied. The defendants then settled all of
the remaining 1,738 claims in the large group on very favorable
terms for plaintiffs.40 In one bifurcated trial in West Virginia in
2002 that involved 4,000 plaintiffs from 35 states suing a sole
defendant, liability and a punitive damages multiplier were decided
during phase one.41 The judge then instructed the parties to
negotiate a settlement of all 4,000 claims. Although settlement
negotiations are still ongoing, they are likely to succeed because
the jury’s decision (in the reverse bifurcated trial) that the
defendant must pay punitive damages of three times any
compensatory damage award makes it extremely risky for the
defendant to proceed to the damages phase.
Judges’ attempts to save trial time by encouraging mass
settlements of asbestos claims may have made the asbestos crisis
37
38
39
40
41

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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more severe by encouraging plaintiffs’ lawyers to flood the courts
with additional claims, according to White.42 The following
feedback seems to have resulted: because of the large numbers of
claims filed in certain amenable fora, judges in these courts adopt
procedural innovations that are intended to reduce trial time and
encourage large numbers of cases to settle. These procedural
innovations also change trial outcomes in a pro-plaintiff
direction.43 When large numbers of asbestos claims are settled on
favorable terms for plaintiffs, then plaintiffs’ lawyers find it
profitable to file additional claims in the same courts. This worsens
the gridlock and pressures judges to continue innovating. The
threat of thousands of claimants free-riding on reduced per-capita
evidentiary scrutiny pressures defendants to settle even when many
claimants are asymptomatic or may have potentially faulty claims.
The cost of responding to uncertainty across the board tends to
increase payouts for lesser claims and reduce available funds for
truly meritorious victims with demonstrable illnesses, though
these, ironically, are the easiest cases to make in individualized
proceedings. Furthermore, once damages can be recovered even in
the face of increased uncertainty, the number of potential plaintiffs
and potential defendants widens again and, as a result, the asbestos
mass tort keeps snowballing.
Thus, though United States courts have been extremely
ingenious in devising ways to deal with thousands of claimants at
once, thus reducing the astronomical costs of individual factfinding, the perverse result of such innovation has been a
preemptive allocation of defendants’ funds to the relatively
uncertain realm of nonmalignant claims, possibly at the expense of
more demonstrably meritorious claims. In a 1994 review, Durkin
and Felstiner characterized the outcome of asbestos-related disease
(ARD) litigation as having failed to provide adequate mechanisms
of compensation to sufferers, despite strong incentives for all sides
to reach resolution.44 “The failed attempts [at various strategic
42

White, supra note 16.
Id.
44
Thomas Edward Durkin & William L. Felstiner, Bad Arithmetic:
Disaster Litigation as Less than the Sum of its Parts, in LEARNING FROM
DISASTER 158 (Jasanoff ed., 1994).
43
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efforts by the parties] provide evidence that what occurred in the
United States overall was more a series of unrelated attempts to
shift financial responsibility than it was cumulative ‘learning.’”45
V. COURT-PROVIDED ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF
A controversial creation of a few bankruptcy courts was the
settlement trust for asbestos claims, most notably the Manville
Personal Injury Settlement Trust.46 Thought by some to be the
solution to mass toxic torts, such trusts were to provide
compensation, superior claims-handling efficiency, equity between
similar claims, and decreased transaction costs.47 Settlement trusts,
however, soon proved problematic: bargaining for the Manville
trust began in 1982, but it did not begin payments to claimants
until 1988. Furthermore, even though the trust began with $1.7
billion in liquid assets, it was rapidly overwhelmed with claims,
settlements that ran 50 percent higher than projections, and a faster
pace of settlements than predicted.48
Victims in the United States who used asbestos, rather than
worked in manufacturing industries, have had the choice of relying
on worker compensation (from employers like shipyards) or
pursuing tort claims. Victims have largely chosen not to rely on
worker compensation, since compensation claims paid
significantly less than tort recoveries and were vulnerable to many
of the same defenses.49 As early as the mid-1980s, Hensler et al.
highlighted the drawbacks presented by workers’ compensation:
Many of the problems we have noted about the tort system,
including timing of claims, standards for proving causation,
and issues arising out of the involvement of multiple
defendants have not been solved by state workers’
compensation systems either. In addition, workers’
45
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compensation systems have usually provided less than full
compensation of wage loss, and no compensation for pain
and suffering.50
Given the above, the current state of United States asbestos
litigation is not surprising. A claimant, possibly having to
surmount a similar burden of proof for state-provided welfare, in
this case workers’ compensation, or a regulated trust, or a tort
claim, will pursue the tort claim when the payoff is substantially
greater and the court system actually facilitates the bringing of
such claims. Even when uncertain about symptoms, the record of
past litigation and a well-trodden path to innovative courts is likely
to continue providing potential claimants with a positive incentive
to file suit.
VI. EUROPE: FEWER CLAIMS, LOWER COMPENSATION
In Europe, asbestos claims have been fewer in number and
have been compensated at significantly lower rates than in the
United States.51 These settlements do not necessarily represent
more just solutions in individual cases, especially for the most
gravely injured plaintiffs. At the same time, the press of asbestos
litigation has not converted the judicial system from its normal
adjudicatory functions into serving as a de facto substitute for a
legislatively and administratively managed health care system.
Up until the end of 1986, the ratio of asbestos-related civil
actions in the United Kingdom compared to the United States was
1:5 even though there were proportionally nearly four times as
many cases of mesothelioma in the United Kingdom. Figures cited
by the firm Norton Rose from 1992-1996 show the average
mesothelioma victim was sixty years old and received $158,660
(compared to the 2001 average of $6 million for successful United
States mesothelioma claimants), the average asbestosis victim was
also sixty years old and received $108,465, and the average lung
50
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cancer victim was sixty-five years old and received $93,340.52
These numbers are far lower than even the lowest United States
average of $322,000 awarded for nonmalignant diseases.
French courts require that claimants surmount a high burden of
proof, demonstrating defendants guilty of “faute inexcusable,” or
outrageous misconduct. A successful case brought by 11 claimants
resulted in the doubling of disability benefits and an award of
$26,000 each.53 In 2000, the French government established the
Compensation Fund for Victims of Asbestos Exposure (FIVA), a
no-fault benefit system to provide automatic compensation for
victims of both occupational and non-occupational exposure to
asbestos; this program is expected to be operational in 2003.54
TABLE 4—AWARDS, BURDENS OF PROOF, AND PENDING CASES

U.S. (19932001)
U.K. (19921996)
Netherlands

Mesothelioma
Mean Award

Asbestosis
Mean
Award

$3.8 million

$1.6
million
$108,000

$159,000
$50,000$80,000

N/A/

Burden
of Proof
for StateProvided
Welfare
High

Burden
of Proof
for Tort
Claims

Pending
Civil
Cases
(est.)

High

Low

High

100,000
s
1,000s

Low

High

100s

In the Netherlands, where total pending civil cases number in
the hundreds, only 10-15 percent is likely to reach court and
successful claimants have been awarded $50,000-$80,000 for
mesothelioma.55 Unlike the United States courts, their Dutch
counterparts have not made substantial changes to expedite the
processing of claims. In order to streamline the compensation
52
53
54
55
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process, however, the Institute of Asbestos Victims (IAV) was set
up in 2000; the culmination of years of lobbying by the Dutch
Committee of Asbestos Victims. Established in 1995 “to secure
justice and compensation for all asbestos victims,” the group
obtained the cooperation of employers, insurers, and the
government.56 Asbestos victims entitled to apply to the IAV are
limited to mesothelioma patients with traceable employers/insurers
whose exposure occurred within a thirty year limitation period.
Interestingly, the IAV tries to resolve claims within four months,
and to bring a claim before the IAV, individuals must renounce the
right to bring a civil action. This combination of an alternative,
speedy method of claim resolution with a relatively transparent
burden of proof and an average award of $45,000-$50,000 is
attractive to Dutch claimants when compared to the numbers of
claims successfully brought in court, the time and risk of litigation,
and corresponding awards that are not significantly more
remunerative. The IAV is incapable of dealing with all of
Holland’s asbestos victims as its rules bar asbestosis, lung cancer
and the 30 percent of mesothelioma patients whose exposure took
place more than thirty years ago. Disqualified victims can apply to
the Government Asbestos Institute (GAI), a tripartite body which
administers a national compensation scheme. Average settlements
of $17,700 are awarded by the GAI.57
CONCLUSION
One great virtue of the common law system is its ability to
carry out case-specific causal determinations, driven by the parties’
desire to establish the facts most relevant to their cases. The history
of asbestos litigation, and of mass torts more generally,58 shows
how this very strength can turn into a source of weakness when
56
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courts are confronted by litigation volumes that overwhelm their
capacity to engage in individualized fact-finding. In the effort to
avoid that burden, United States courts over time have
demonstrated extraordinary innovative capacity to streamline
procedures and consolidate cases. The perverse result of these
measures, however, has been to encourage still more litigants to
pursue claims based on uncertain exposure to one of the most
pervasive, as well as most deadly, of known toxic agents in the
human environment. Defendants, for their part, have been
encouraged to settle the seemingly endless flood of claims, with
results that vary arbitrarily across legal jurisdictions and classes of
claimants.
The sharp contrast between the United States situation and that
in other industrial countries can be traced, in our view, to the
state’s backstop role in providing general health and welfare
remedies for citizens. Where those costs are to some extent
nationalized, and disease victims are taken care of through a
system of universal coverage, whatever the source of their injuries,
they have less incentive to sue for damages; correspondingly, the
state can raise the entry barriers to litigation without abandoning
sick citizens to open-ended health care costs and inadequate relief
for even the gravest injuries. The decoupling of compensation from
prior causal determinations leads, we would argue, to more
efficient, as well as potentially more egalitarian solutions in cases
where the causes are uncertain and the effects are distributed in
indeterminate ways, as in the asbestos case, across vast numbers of
individuals.
Of course, the United States courts, too, have sought in effect
to decouple the pinpointing of cause in each individual case from
providing across-the-board remedies to rationally grouped classes
of claimants. The failure of court-established administrative
mechanisms such as the Manville Trust highlights the inadequacy
of even these seemingly efficient approaches. Lacking an effective
basic system of health care, any person with a colorable claim to
asbestos-induced disease has found attractive the prospect of
turning to one or another judicially provided remedial scheme,
whether through tort litigation or through a trust or fund. The result
has been a snowballing of claims and no end in sight to the torrent
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of asbestos lawsuits.
In a zero-risk society, cases like asbestos would never arise
because science would have the knowledge and regulators the
foresight to prevent such threats from materializing in the first
place. We, however, are inescapably the inhabitants of what the
German sociologist Ulrich Beck has called “risk society”; in such
societies the cost of progress and of desirable innovation is that
some people will suffer adverse consequences that cannot be
known in advance or effectively guarded against.59 The only
humane response in democratic societies is to assume collective
responsibility for these externalities of our communal desire for
social and technological advancement. Judgments about how much
to pay the victims of progress will still call for difficult decisions,
but courts are not the places where the relevant trade-offs can be
most fully and fairly debated. The asbestos story suggests that even
the world’s most venturesome court system cannot efficaciously
pick up the pieces when knowledge and foresight fail us—as they
inevitably will continue to do, and unpredictably so, in future
cases.
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